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COMSAT'S FIRST DECADE: DIFFICULTIES IN
INTERPRETING THE COMMUNICATIONS
SATELLITE ACT OF 1962
I. INTRODUCTION
The enactment of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962' (herein-
after referred to as the Act) marked the beginning of a new era in the field
of communications for the United States. President Kennedy and the Con-
gress felt an urgent need to stimulate all available talent and resources
toward the development of a global communications satellite system, while
maintaining private competition in the procurement of equipment and the
providing of services to the public. The result was the creation of Comsat,
a private' communications corporation intended to be a unique experiment
in public and private ownership under close supervision by the federal
government.
Comsat's goal is to provide a global communications satellite system
"which will be responsive to public needs and national objectives, which
will serve the communication needs of the United States and other coun-
tries, and which will contribute to world peace and understanding." 3 From
the Act's inception, it was recognized that foreign cooperation would be
essential if the global dimensions envisioned by the Act were to be
achieved;' however, due to conflicts inherent within the structure of Com-
sat, both the development of the satellite system and the United States'
dealings with the rest of the world were handicapped. This Note will trace
the development of this global satellite system, pointing out the inherent
conflicts within Comsat and indicating the effect they had on the accom-
plishment of the goals set out in the Act. 5
47 U.S.C. §§ 701-44 (1970).
Id. § 701(c). Although the Act specifically refers to the corporation as "private," there is
controversy surrounding a definition of the exact nature of the entity. One view suggests that
the character of the corporation is that of a joint venture between the federal government and
private industry. Levin, Organization and Control of Communications Satellites, 113 U. PA.
L. REv. 315, 324-25 (1964-1965). [hereinafter cited as Levin]. Another commentator prefers
to describe the corporation as quasi-public. Scrader, The Communications Satellite Corpora-
tion: A New Experiment in Government and Business, 53 Ky. L.J. 732, 736 (1964-1965)
[hereinafter cited as Schrader]. Yet another view, with the benefit of several years of opera-
tional perspective, suggests that "Comsat clearly evolved further toward becoming a purely
private company than its creators intended." M. KINSLEY, OUTER SPACE AND INNER SANCTUMS
195 (1976) [hereinafter cited as KINSLEY].
Act, 47 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970).
M. SCHWARTZ & J. GOLDSEN, FOREIGN PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE AcT OF
1962 4 (Rand Memo No. 3484-RC, Feb. 1963) [hereinafter cited as Rand Memo].
Among the Act's enumerated goals are: (1) the rapid development of a commercial global
communications satellite system, (2) the extension of such services to economically less
developed areas as well as well-developed areas, (3) efficient and economical use of the
electromagnetic frequency spectrum, (4) reflection of the benefits of this system in both
quality of services and charges for such services, (5) nondiscriminatory access to the system
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Organization of Comsat
Congress engaged in extensive debate regarding the advantages of pri-
vate versus public ownership before the structure of Comsat was finalized."
Formerly, in 1960, it had appeared as if American Telephone and Tele-
graph Corporation (AT&T) would itself develop and control the satellite
system.' In order to avoid the appearance of monopolization of the indus-
try, AT&T joined with Western Union International Corporation, Interna-
tional Telephone and Telegraph, and RCA to propose to the Congress an
exclusive consortium directed toward the development of space satellite
communications.' President Kennedy countered with a plan providing for
complete private ownership but limiting the interest of any individual or
corporation to a maximum of 15-20 percent.' Numerous proposals were
submitted by both private and governmental sectors, ranging from com-
plete government ownership to total control by existing private interna-
tional communication carriers. 0 Congress felt the need to strike a compro-
mise, due to an impending threat of Soviet leadership in space communi-
cations and also in order to enhance the poor legislative record of the 78th
Congress." The result was the creation of a quasi-public entity, 2 with half
its ownership available to the international common carriers and the other
half open to the public. 13
Although the concept of total government ownership of the satellite
system was given little support, much could be said in its favor. A govern-
ment owned arrangement could insure access by all interested parties
by all authorized users, (6) the maintenance of maximum competition among private indus-
try in the provision of equipment and services utilized by the system, (7) the continuation of
competition in the provision of communications services to the public, and (8) adherence to
Federal antitrust laws. The Congress did not intend to preclude the use of the communica-
tions satellite system for domestic communication services where consistent with the Act's
provisions, nor to preclude the development of additional'communications satellite systems,
if required. 47 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)-(d) (1970).
' See generally Hearings on Antitrust Problems of the Space Satellite Communications
System Before the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); Hearings on Communications Satellites Before the House Comm.
on Science and Astronautics, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
D. SMrrIH, COMMUNICATIONS VIA SATELLITE 74 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SMITH].
KINSLEY, supra note 2, at 4.
Id. at 5.
For a general discussion of the debate concerning the creation of Comsat, see SMITH,
supra note 7, at 93-108.
11 J. GALLOWAY, THE PoLrrlcs AND TECHNOLOGY OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS 71 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as GALLOWAY].
' 47 U.S.C. §§ 731-35 (1970).
'" "The passage of the Act culminated a process which had been characterized by bargain-
ing and compromise but also by polemics and ideological involvement." GALLOWAY, supra
note 11, at 69.
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without discrimination. Moreover, such an arrangement would go towards
the elimination of possible conflicts of interest resulting from private own-
ership of both ground stations and the system itself." "Such ownership
promised maximum coordination of civilian and military space programs
and an end to reliance on ineffective regulation under conditions of natural
monopoly."' 5 The proponents of government ownership mounted a four
pronged attack against private ownership: (1) conflict with antitrust laws
could occur since the major carriers were also the largest equipment sup-
pliers, (2) an early transfer of satellite operations to the private sector
could result in a mediocre system, (3) since government funds developed
the satellite technology, the benefits belonged to the public taxpayers, and
(4) due to the corporation's direct dealings with foreign governments it
would be placed in a position to establish foreign policy.'" The passage of
time did not allay the fears of those advocating government ownership.
B. Internal Structure of Comsat
The corporation created by the Communications Satellite Act of 1962
has been termed "quasi-public" due to "the various. . . controls. . . plus
the presidential appointment of directors and obvious future interrela-
tionship with other federal [sic] agencies .... '"' Both internal and ex-
ternal controls were established in an effort to protect the public interest.
Internal controls consisted of a broad base of ownership and the placement
of government representatives on the board of directors. 8 Section 734 deals
with the financing of the corporation and allows authorized communica-
tions common carriers to own up to 50 percent of the stock. Section 733
stipulates that the board of directors consist of 15 members: six chosen by
the international carriers, six elected by the other stockholders, and the
remaining three appointed by the President with the consent of the Sen-
" Levin, supra note 2, at 334.
Id. During Senate hearings, it was claimed that:
Not only does the committee bill create a private monopoly, it would go even
further and bestow on that single private monopoly the benefits of billions of dollars
of the taxpayers' money. This legislation, if enacted, likely would constitute the
biggest giveaway in the history of the United States.
S. REP. No. 1584, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2269, 2309 (minority views). The report continued:
Thus, in the interest of fostering competition and innovation in the communica-
tions satellite field, separate ownership of international communications carriers
and the communications satellite system is not only advisable but essential. Private
ownership and control of the space satellites would carry with it a built-in conflict
of interest that would inevitably tend to slow down the most rapid development and
maximum utilization of the best possible satellite system.
S. REP. No. 1584 at 52, [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2310-11.
" SMITH, supra note 7, at 106-07.
" Schrader, supra note 2, at 736.
" SMITH, supra note 7, at 108.
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ate. 9 It was hoped that under such an arrangement, ultimate control of the
corporation would be exercised by those possessing superior managerial
ability rather than political influence. 0 As it turned out, the presidential
appointees have been prominent private citizens easily susceptible to ma-
nipulation, and with little experience in communications.'
External control is manifested in several provisions of the Act, one of
which prescribes seven functions that the President"2 directs to insure that
the corporation operates according to the objectives of the United States
in establishing a global communications satellite system which will con-
tribute to "world peace and understanding."23 The National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) serves as technical consultant and fur-
nishes launch facilities on a reimbursable basis.2' The Federal Communi-
cations Commission (FCC) is given extensive regulatory power over the
"1 Under the provisions of the original Act, the international carriers were allowed to choose
six directors regardless of the percentage of stock they owned. Section 733 was amended in
1969, establishing a proportional system whereby the number of directors elected by the
communications carriers is directly proportional to the percentage of carrier-owned stock.
47 U.S.C. § 733 (1962), as amended Pub. L. No. 91-3, 83 Stat. 4, 47 U.S.C. § 733 (1970).
Schrader, supra note 2, at 734.
21 KINSLEY, supra note 2, at 205-11. Kinsley points out that the presidential directors were
ineffective due to their lack of expertise. Id. at 208. "Both the practicalities of life and the
lessons of history lead to the conclusion that the appointment of government directors to a
private board cannot effectively protect the public interest against private abuse." Schwartz,
Governmentally Appointed Directors in a Private Corporation - The Communications Satel-
lite Act of 1962, 79 HARV. L. REv. 350, 363 (1965-1966).
47 U.S.C. § 721(a) (1970). Specifically, the President shall:
(1) aid in the planning and development and foster the execution of a national
program for the establishment and operation, as expeditiously as possible, of a
commercial communications satellite system;
(2) provide for continuous review of all phases of the development and operation
of such a system, including the activities of a communications satellite corporation
authorized under subchapter III of this chapter;
(3) coordinate the activities of governmental agencies with responsibilities in the
field of telecommunication, so as to insure that there is full and effective compli-
ance at all times with the policies set forth in this chapter;
(4) exercise such supervision over relationships of the corporation with foreign
governments or entities or with international bodies as may be appropriate to assure
that such relationships shall be consistent with the national interest and foreign
policy of the United States;
(5) insure that timely arrangements are made under which there can be foreign
participation in the establishment and use of a communications satellite system;
(6) take all necessary steps to insure the availability and appropriate utilization
of the communications satellite system for general governmental purposes except
where a separate communications satellite system is required to meet unique gov-
ernmental needs, or is otherwise required in the national interest; and
(7) so exercise his authority as to help attain coordinated and efficient use of the
electromagnetic spectrum and the technical compatibility of the system with exist-
ing communications facilities both in the United States and abroad.
I d. § 701(a).
24 Id. § 721(b).
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activities of the corporation.Y Additionally, upon entering into business
negotiations with any international or foreign entity with respect to facili-
ties, operations, or services, Comsat is required to notify the State Depart-
ment of such negotiations. 6 The State Department then advises the corpo-
ration of relevant foreign policy considerations." This elaborate system of
checks and balances seems to have provided no obstacle with respect to
the objectives of the major common carriers. An examination of the early
years of Comsat's development demonstrates that the major carriers had
little difficulty in attaining favorable rulings in areas where their other
non-satellite private investments were at stake."'
III. CONFLICTS IN DEVELOPMENT
A great deal of concern was voiced over the sufficiency of the incentive
given the international common carriers to develop a communications sat-
ellite system in direct competition with their existing cable facilities.'
Proponents of the bill thought that close government supervision would
guard against any hesitancy by the carriers to pursue a truly effective
satellite system. In actuality, the statutory monopoly created by the bill
encouraged close cooperation among the participating carriers.', The fol-
2, Id. § 721(c). The Commission's ability to perform its regulatory functions will be dis-
cussed later in this Note.
" Id. § 742. Amendments to the original Administration bill drastically limited the role of
the State Department.
SId.
A prime illustration is AT&T's continued insistence upon expanding its cable facilities
despite the proven economy and efficiency of satellites. When satellite circuits first became
available over the North Atlantic, AT&T agreed to use them until the route was served by
approximately equal members of satellite and cable circuits. Following years of legal maneu-
vering, this 50-50 policy became the FCC's reasonable parity guideline. As a result, the
enormous proliferation of satellite circuits has supported the carriers' arguments for new
cables to maintain this reasonable parity, rather than reduce their need, which would be the
logical conclusion. The FCC's TAT-5 cable decision is a perfect case where AT&T urged the
need for a new cable solely on the basis of balance. See Applications for Authorization to
Participate in the Construction and Operation of an Integrated Submarine Cable and Radio
System Between the U.S. Mainland and Spain, Portugal, and Italy, 13 F.C.C. 2d 235 (May
22, 1968).
"Congress . . . feared that common carriers with substantial investments in existing
undersea cable and high frequency radio facilities would attempt to protect their investments
by retarding new developments which threatened them with obsolescence." Note, The Com-
munications Satellite Corporation: Toward a Workable Telecommunications Policy, 27
HASTINGS L.J. 721, 733 (1975-1976) [hereinafter cited as HASTINGS NOTE].
" "Its proponents also hoped that it would provide greater inducements to economic effi-
ciency .... ." Levin, supra note 2, at 335. See SMrrH, supra note 7, at 106; Katzenbach,
Address on Communications Satellite Legislation, 7 ANTrrnusT BULL. 421, 424-25 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Katzenbach].
" HASTINGS NOTE, supra note 29, at 734. See Sen. Russell Long's (D. La.) attack on carrier
participation in which he characterized the bill as being "as crooked as a barrel of snakes."
108 CONG. REc. 1511 (1962).
lowing FCC decisions, dealing with ambiguities in the Act, illustrate just
how successful the carriers were in obtaining favorable rulings.
A. Ownership of Earth Stations
"The earth station problem dramatizes the difficulty of using an estab-
lished regulated industry, with a heavy fixed investment in old equipment,
to introduce a new technology."3 In the first years of operation, Comsat
owned and operated the three existing earth stations.Y When a request was
made to construct another needed station in West Virginia, the carriers
protested vehemently. The result was a decision by the FCC in 19663, to
grant the carriers half ownership in the earth stations, thereby reversing a
ruling more favorable to Comsat issued only 19 months earlier.3 The Com-
mission gave to the Earth Station Ownership Consortium, in which owner-
ship of the earth stations was split equally between Comsat and the car-
riers, responsibility for "formulating overall policy and deciding on major
investments, types of major equipment and location of new stations, and
the establishment of arrangements for the day-to-day operations of the
station."3 This arrangement included shared management of the stations
and control of the "local loops."37 Thus, the major carriers apparently
utilized their influence and power to cause a complete reversal by the FCC
of its earlier decision. They claimed that ownership of the stations was
necessary for them to contribute to the development of the-art, yet their
building activities, both domestic and foreign, should have" Seen sufficient
to supply the needed incentive. Their argument that a Comsat monopoly
would be against the spirit of the Act had little basis, since the Act explic-
itly permits an earth station monopoly as one of the FCC's alternatives.3
Schwartz, Comsat, the Carriers, and the Earth Stations: Some Problems with "Melding
Variegated Interests," 76 YALE L.J. 441, 444 (1966-1967) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz].
"The earth station is a large, dish-shaped broadcasting and receiving antenna aimed at
a satellite orbiting 22,300 miles above earth." A message is sent via the earth station to the
satellite, which relays the signal to another earth station near the point of destination. It is
then sent from the receiving station by a "local loop." KINsLEY, supra note 2, at 27.
1, Amendment of Part 25 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations with Respect to
Ownership and Operation of Initial Earth Stations in the United States for Use in Connection
with the Proposed Global Commercial Communication-Satellite System, 5 F.C.C. 2d 812
(Dec. 7, 1966).
1 Amendment of Part 25 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations with Respect to
Ownership and Operation of Initial Earth Stations in the United States for Use in Connection
with the Proposed Global Commercial Communication-Satellite System, 38 F.C.C. 1104
(May 12, 1965).
m 5 F.C.C. 2d at 820.
3' The local loops are the connections between the earth station sites and the common
carrier facilities. For an excellent discussion of the earth station controversy see KINSLEY,
supra note 2, at 26-46.
47 U.S.C. § 721(c)(7). In pertinent part, the FCC shall:
grant appropriate authorizations for the construction and operation of each satellite
terminal station, either to the corporation or to one or more authorized carriers or
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The carriers' real concern was a threat to their present and projected rate
base raised by an independent satellite system. 9
By denying Comsat complete ownership of the earth stations, the FCC
destroyed any real chance for competition in the communications industry.
Under the FCC ruling, the carriers are able to participate in more decision
making at the earth station level, where they have a sure veto and are
unaffected by conflicting fiduciary obligations10 Comsat's independent
control of the stations would have provided vigorous competition so as not
to require such close regulation.' Instead, the FCC chose to protect the
interests of the existing industry.
B. Authorized Users
Another major ambiguity in the Act which required resolution by the
FCC involved the question of which users would be allowed to lease satel-
lite circuits directly from Comsat. Many large users other than the partici-
pating major carriers wanted to lease long-term circuits directly from Com-
sat. The international carriers insisted that the Act was intended to protect
their investments by granting them exclusive buying and selling rights.,,
The policy argument advocated by the carriers claimed:
that the carriers, prevented by the Satellite Act from establishing satellite
facilities, had to depend on Comsat for satellite circuits, and it would be
inequitable to allow Comsat to provide the profitable leased channels
to the corporation and one or more such carriers jointly, as will best serve the public
interest, convenience, and necessity.
See also Schwartz, supra note 32, at 456.
11 With full ownership of the earth stations and the local loops, Comsat would be able to
offer service fully equivalent to that of the international carriers. KINSLEY, supra note 2, at
37. The "rate base" system is used by the FCC to determine the amount of profit allowed,
based upon investments in equipment.
It is clear that in a monopoly situation, locked into a predetermined maximum rate
of profit, a firm will have little incentive to eliminate unnecessary expenses. In fact,
it will usually have a positive incentive to try to get away with unnecessary invest-
ments, because these will add to its rate base.
Id. at 31-32. This tendency to invest unwisely and excessively to expand the rate base is
known as the Averch-Johnson effect. J. Dingell quotes from the General Services Administra-
tion:
It is time to abandon the thesis that regulation is the law's substitute for competi-
tion. Even where monopoly is benign, it is dangerous for monopoly to make the
decisions. Both friends and foes of the regulatory process acknowledge its limits in
affecting incentives, promotion of economy and developing efficiency and optimum
cost of services. Regulation is essentially negative. It should utilize competition as
a powerful supplement.
Dingell, The Role of Spectrum Allocation in Monopoly or Competitition in Communications,
13 ANTITRUST BULL. 937, 943 (1968).
40 Schwartz, supra note 32, at 476.
' "But the structure they [FCC] did create is so full of potential conflicts and opportuni-
ties for insider self-preference that constant policing will be needed." Id. at 483.
1' KINSLEY, supra note 2, at 50.
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directly to the large users and offer to the carriers only the less desirable
services . Comsat would offer services to users and to carriers at sub-
stantially the same rate, and this would prevent the carriers from reselling
satellite service to users on competitive terms. 3
The FCC seemingly agreed with this "cream skimming" argument and
resolved the issue in favor of the carriers." Once again the FCC adminis-
tered a serious blow to the possibility that Comsat might serve as a com-
petitive alternative to the existing communications industry .
5
The FCC also forbade Comsat from leasing circuits directly to the
United States Government despite explicit language in the Act authorizing
them to do so.46 The Commission concluded that the reference to the gov-
ernment was reserved only for unique and exceptional situations. 7 The
Government tested this ruling less than a year later when the Defense
Department approached Comsat concerning the leasing of 30 satellite cir-
cuits from Hawaii to the Far East to monitor the Vietnam War. The
Commission ruled that the Government had to purchase the circuits from
the carriers at a "composite rate."' 8 As a result, internationally leased
circuit rates remained abnormally high, inhibiting the growth of Comsat
and discouraging the aim of the Act to provide a global service at reasona-
ble rates.'
Looking back over the reports on the earth station and authorized users
decisions, one cannot help but be struck by Comsat's timid objections and
questionable concessions. In its annual reports to the President, Comsat
has consistently failed to utilize its avenue of recommendation granted to
13 Acheson, Competition Problems in International Communications, 13 ANTITRUST BULL.
963, 966 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Acheson].
,1 Authorized Entities and Authorized Users Under the Communications Satellite Act of
1962, 4 F.C.C. 2d 421 (July 20, 1966) [hereinafter cited as Authorized Users].
,1 "Clearly, if there were to be unrestricted dealings of Comsat with the public, it would
mean that Comsat would be using its monopoly position to the detriment of the other carriers
and, indeed, to deprive them of the opportunity to serve segments of the public under fair
and equitable conditions." Id. at 428.
" "[Tihe corporation is authorized to ... contract with authorized users, including the
United States Government, for the services of the communications satellite system ......
47 U.S.C. § 735(b)(4) (1970).
,1 Authorized Users, supra note 44, at 435. The Commission noted that "loss of a substan-
tial proportion of Government leased circuit revenues could have serious adverse effect upon
the carriers. Instead of being able to reduce rates to reflect the lower costs of satellite circuits,
they would probably have to seek substantial rate increases." Id. at 434. The Commission
also noted that the Government provides over 70 percent of total leased circuit revenues.
11 The carriers were to provide both satellite and cable circuits at a composite rate of $7,100.
The cable rates at the time were approximately $11,000 per half circuit and Comsat had
offered direct service for $4,000 per half circuit. The Commission ordered Comsat to sell the
satellite circuits to the carriers for $3,800. Acheson, supra note 43, at 968. "The net of this is
that, at the direction of the FCC, the carriers' revenues from satellite service they sell pay a
substantial part of the costs of the cable system." Id.
" In 1967 the international carriers were buying half circuits from Comsat for $2,700 a
month and selling them to users for $8,000. KINSLEY, supra note 2, at 63.
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it by the Act. These failures on the part of Comsat can only point towards
the inherent conflicts and self-preferences imbedded within its structure.
The influence exerted by the carriers through their participation in the
management of Comsat is more than apparent from this line of decisions.
The result has been an even greater concentration of power in the existing
communications carriers and the inhibition of any possibility of realizing
a truly competitive system. Attention will now be turned to the inter-
national realm in order to see what impact the organizational structure of
Comsat has had on the development of a global satellite system.
IV. COMSAT'S DEALINGS ABROAD
The initial impetus for developing a global communications satellite
system was a national challenge to be the forerunner in providing leader-
ship in the peaceful use of outer space for the benefit of all mankind. "Here
a successful program should pay dividends for us and other countries, not
only in economic terms but also in terms of such important intangibles as
the development of mutually helpful attitudes, institutions and relation-
ships."' The Act expressly noted the need for foreign cooperation in the
system 52 and consequently placed several controls on Comsat's ability to
negotiate abroad. This need for foreign cooperation resulted in numerous
areas of conflict for Comsat during its formative years, in dealing with both
the United States Government and foreign entities . 5
V. THE EMERGENCE OF INTELSAT
The terms regarding participation in an international satellite system
were not specified in the Act, in spite of the potential impact upon Ameri-
can foreign policy objectives. The need to formulate specific guidelines in
order to insure effective negotiations with foreign nations was recognized
47 U.S.C. § 744(b) (1970).
SI Katzenbach, supra note 30, at 423.
47 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970). See Rand Memo, supra note 4, at 17.
Schwartz and Goldsen include the following: 47 U.S.C. §§ 721(a)(4), 721(a)(5), 721(c)(3),
and 742. Rand Memo, supra note 4, at 18-19. 47 U.S.C. § 742 is the basic provision for con-
trol over Comsat's dealings abroad. 47 U.S.C. § 721(c)(3) states that the FCC should require
the corporation to establish communications with a particular country where the Secretary
of State advised that such communication was in the national interest.
11 Through the authority of the President to oversee relations with foreign governments (47
U.S.C. § 721(a)(4)), the State Department would control foreign relations and Comsat would
control business negotiations, but the relations between these two remain uncertain.
GALLOWAY, supra note 11, at 73. "Once the State Department classifies a particular problem
as one of 'foreign policy,' it will no doubt insist on fulfilling its statutory role, even though
the Corporation might prefer to handle the problem as a purely business matter." Rand
Memo, supra note 4, at 19. For a discussion of these conflicts in the creation of a global
satellite system, see GALLOWAY, supra note 11, at 82; Underwood, Problems of Participation
in the Global Commercial Communications Satellite System, 18 S.C.L. REv. 796, 799-807
[hereinafter cited as Underwood].
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immediately. 5 No sooner had the new corporation come into existence
than it objected to the State Department's interference with its interna-
tional policy planning. 8 Comsat officials envisioned the establishment of
a system based on a series of bilateral agreements (similar to their cable
arrangements) with the result that the United States would be situated in
the "center of the web."57 As an alternative, they desired an American
owned system that leased out the circuits. 58 The State Department op-
posed these proposals and advocated a multilateral arrangement allowing
for more flexibility.59 The dispute was resolved in favor of pursuing a multi-
lateral arrangement which would encourage foreign nations to participate
in the use and ownership of the system. 0 Relations between Comsat and
the State Department improved considerably following these initial differ-
ences, but Comsat's dealings abroad were destined to be plagued by con-
flicts.
A plan for an international communications satellite association was
first conceived in October of 1963, at a conference of the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU). 1 By July 1964, the negotiating coun-
tries had managed to resolve their initial differences and had agreed to the
Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite
System.2 A month later the group officially established the International
Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT)." The United
States was able to dominate the shaping and control of INTELSAT from
the outset, due to its superior technological expertise and its major role in
the operation of international message circuits.2 Comsat emerged as the
general manager of the system and received 61 percent of the voting power
based upon the volume of American use in the system. 5 This insured
'5 SMITH, supra note 7, at 130-31.
Id. at 131. Philip Graham, publisher of the Washington Post, was elected the first
chairman but due to illness he was replaced by Leo Welch after only three months. Mr. Welch
also attacked the FCC for its invasion in Comsat's managerial functions.
51 Chayes, Unilateralism in United States Satellite Communications in THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF COMMUNICATIONs 42, 45 (E. McWhinner ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Chayes].
5 Id.
5, SMITH, supra note 7, at 131.
Id. at 135. The State Department attempted to overcome the differences by convincing
Comsat that the Europeans urged a multilateral agreement and that they were serving as the
chosen instrument of American foreign policy and not as a private enterprise. GALLOWAY,
supra note 11, at 82.
11 HASTINGS NOTE, supra note 29, at 739.
62 Aug. 20, 1964, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1705, T.I.A.S. No. 5646, 514 U.N.T.S. 26 (effective for
United States Aug. 20, 1964).
63 GALLOWAY, supra note 11, at 99. See McWhinney, The Antinomy of Policy and Function
in the Institutionalization of International Telecommunications Broadcasting, 13 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 3, 9 (1974) [hereinafter cited as McWhinney].
" SMITH, supra note 7, at 140-41.
Id. at 138.
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Comsat virtually complete control over the system during its formative
years."
Despite smooth functioning of both the space and ground segments of
the system, Comsat was unable to deal effectively with the other foreign
members. Dr. Reinhold Steiner, the only non-American fulltime, perma-
nent representative to INTELSAT, said, "If you consider the interest of
the U.S. in improving relations with other countries, Comsat has failed.
Of all the international carriers, Comsat has the worst reputation."67 Com-
sat's management of the system was criticized because it "wore 'three hats'
at the same time-as a U.S. internal, domestic, common carrier for profit;
as the U.S. national representative to INTELSAT; and, finally, as the
general managerial authority within INTELSAT itself.""8 Much of this
criticism may be warranted when one views the manner in which procure-
ment of equipment and the handling of contracts was conducted. Only 5
percent of over $380 million spent by INTELSAT through the middle of
1971 was spent outside the United States." In light of these figures one can
easily understand why Comsat, the only privately owned carrier in INTEL-
SAT, came under such critical attack."
Due to Comsat's inability to generate goodwill within INTELSAT, the
United States found it difficult to retain much of the power it formerly
enjoyed when the Interim Arrangement was renegotiated. At the European
Space Telecommunications Conference of 1967, the European nations
agreed "on the desirability of removing Comsat as the system manager,
restricting its voting power and developing separate, regional system '."',
Meanwhile, under pressure from the State Department and the FCC,
Comsat agreed to internationalize some management functions while re-
taining technical and operational control. The same major issues of 1964,
i.e., ownership quotas, voting arrangements, and management, were the
principal areas of controversy in the Definitive Arrangements negotia-
tions .72
After more than two years of negotiation, the Definitive Arrangements
" Chayes, supra note 57, at 46.
But the Interim Arrangements did not provide the conditions for the growth of
confidence in the consortium as an international instrument responsive to the inter-
national community. Intelsat became, for the most part, an arena in which Ameri-
cans and Europeans battled out and traded out parochial interests without achiev-
ing a larger vision of international communications requirements.
'T KINSLEY, supra note 2, at 115.
McWhinney, supra note 63, at 11.
" KINSLEY, supra note 2, at 119. Comsat was also accused of manipulating its managerial
role for private purposes in procuring contracts for INTELSAT IV satellites. See id. at 122-
26.
70 "As a private company, Comsat has been less successful than an experienced government
agency might be in dealing with foreign representatives." Id. at 115.
71 SMiTH, supra note 7, at 144.
7 GALLOWAY, supra note 11, at 158.
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were finalized in August 1971, to become effective in February 1973. 71 The
most important changes provided for a Director General to replace Comsat
as the head executive over a 6 year transitional period. A Board of Gover-
nors was created to consist of approximately the top 20 investors. Comsat
will continue to perform technical and operational services until 1979
under a management services contract." Even after drastic reductions in
Comsat's control, the other members further insured their control by re-
quiring a two thirds majority vote by the Assembly of Parties (based on a
one nation - one vote scheme) in order to decide substantive matters.7 5 At
this point, one can only speculate as to whether INTELSAT will continue
to provide necessary services or if any future expansion in services will have
to occur outside its framework. \
VI. THE RESOLUTION OF AMBIGUITIES IN OUR FOREIGN OBJECTIVES
The developments over the past decade furnish one basis for determin-
ing whether the United States has been successful in establishing a global
communications satellite system, as it had been originally envisioned. Due
to the unique nature of the venture, there are several ambiguities in the
Act which stem from foreign policy considerations. These include: (1) the
urgency in establishing the system, (2) the meaning of "peace and under-
standing," (3) the nature of United States leadership, (4) the kind of
participation by foreign countries, and (5) the relations between the De-
partment of State and Comsat.7"
The desire to establish a communications satellite system at the earliest
possible time was primarily motivated by Russian success with Sputnik."
Since the technical knowledge necessary to develop a global satellite com-
munications system was still several years away, the ownership issue
should have been studied more carefully before enacting legislation which
had the effect of circumventing the antitrust laws. The Act's goal, to stim-
ulate all available talent and resources, was probably more hindered than
aided by the grant of corporate control to the owners of an old technology
with which the corporation was in direct competition. This hindrance did
not appear to impede the establishment of an international consortium,
since the United States government managed to manipulate the develop-
ment of the consortium through its prescribed powers in the Act." But as
11 Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
"Intelsat," Aug. 20, 1971, [1972] 23 U.S.T. 3813, T.I.A.S. No. 7532 (effective Feb. 12, 1973).
' SMrTH, supra note 7, at 151.
I' d. at 150.
" GALLOWAY, supra note 11, at 100.
" Id. at 47.
7' One view states that the successful establishment of a global satellite system can be
attributed to the government's approach of cooperation and participation toward Comsat.
GALLOWAY, supra note 11, at 101-02. For example, the government achieved a cohesive and
united position with Comsat in foreign negotiations. Id. at 103.
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has been seen, the carriers did succeed in winning several decisions which
resulted in keeping international circuit rates unnecessarily high.79
The Government's goal of achieving world peace and understanding has
the appearance of failure in the early years of INTELSAT. Comsat's activi-
ties as manager of the international system were strongly criticized as
being tainted by the carriers' private interests. 0 The decision to organize
Comsat as Congress did, "meant from the outset that United States for-
eign policy objectives and perceptions in the field would be filtered
through a private entity with divergent goals and perspectives."', The
legislative history indicates that Congress failed to see the international
ramifications of the Act. Speaking optimistically before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Secretary of State Dean Rusk said: "The fact that
the corporation will be owned and the capital supplied by private compa-
nies and individuals will not impair the ability of the United States to
cooperate successfully with other countries and international organizations
in establishing a global communications system.""2 History now shows
there was little difficulty in establishing the global system, but much
controversy resulted from having a private corporation represent American
foreign interests. Comsat's difficulties with the Government at home had
an adverse effect upon its dealings abroad, where previously the interna-
tional carriers had an excellent track record with telecommunications sys-
tems overseas.3 As a result, the United States leadership role in the global
system has been cut back substantially by the Definitive Arrangements
revamping INTELSAT.
The current membership in INTELSAT indicates worldwide partici-
pation, with the exception of the Soviet bloc. 4 During the early years, the
provision of services to the developing countries took place slowly, due to
the immediate need to follow high volume routes in order to insure eco-
nomic security. But today, almost worldwide services are available, and
the smaller countries play a greater role under the new arrangements. On
the other hand, participation by other nations in the manufacturing of
components was severely limited in the early years, causing much discord
among the members.85 Hopefully, the improvement of technological capa-
11 Recall the earth station ownership decision, note 34 supra, and Authorized Users deci-
sion, note 44 supra.
'* "Comsat's attitude has antagonized foreign governments and has been accused of slow-
ing development of the international satellite system." KINSLEY, supra note 2, at 117.
11 Chayes, supra note 57, at 44.
82 Hearings on the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 173 (1962).
13 HASTINGS NOTE, supra note 29, at 739.
'3 INTELSAT presently has 94 members and accounts for over 90 percent of the interna-
tional communications traffic by satellite.
11 SMITH, supra note 7, at 142. "In order to ensure that the U.S. aerospace industry re-
mained the leader in technology development, the federal government placed controls on the
exportation of technology likely to be applied to communications satellites." Id.
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bilities among more countries, along with the change in INTELSAT's
management, will remedy this problem.
The difficulties resulting from the ambiguous role of the State Depart-
ment became immediately apparent. The State Department's concern
over foreign policy implications was demonstrated by its avid support of
the President's original bill, which would have allowed the State Depart-
ment to conduct or supervise the foreign negotiations of the corporation.8
Despite several alterations in the bill which resulted in changing the State
Department's role to an advisory one, 7 history now shows that this limited
control was used in conjunction with the President's powers under section
721(a) (4) to control most of the foreign policy developments. This control
over foreign policy by the executive branch supports the contention of
Secretary Rusk that the bill provided the United States Government with
adequate authority to protect our foreign policy objectives; however, the
use of a private corporation to implement American plans caused more
problems than expected.
The early controversies between Comsat and the Government concern-
ing ownership, treaty arrangements, and management of INTELSAT illus-
trate the uncertainties prompted by ambiguities in the Act. 8 The Govern-
ment's role during the early operating years of INTELSAT was limited so
that it would not appear as if the United States was using Comsat's mana-
gerial role to shape the direction of the entire international consortium. Yet
the State Department did not hesitate to intervene during negotiation of
the Definitive Arrangements so as to insure compatibility with our foreign
objectives. As a result of all this confusion, "neither the United States
itself nor foreign governments or communications entities can know en-
tirely who is dealing with whom and with what authority.""
VII. CONCLUSION
The history of the development of the international communications
satellite system casts some doubt on the propriety of the choice that the
United States made in 1962.8 In its haste to create a global satellite sys-
tem, the 87th Congress created a structure "which contemplates numerous
interlocking directorates; creates a backward and forward vertical joint
" GALLOWAY, supra note 11, at 49. "From this, one can infer that the State Department
foresaw the possibility that a private corporation controlling satellite communications might
not always act in the best interests of the United States." Id.
' 47 U.S.C. § 742 (1970).
GALLOWAY, supra note 11, at 82.
" Underwood, supra note 54, at 799.
" "The fact is that technological change in satellite communications brought a new order
of complexity into communications policy. Technological change widened the area of choice
and at the same time confused the old pattern of expectations. These consequences of tech-
nological innovation encouraged legislative decision-making and incrementalist rationality."
GALLOWAY, supra note 11, at 104.
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venture; and provides for substantial minority interests by companies
which are simultaneously potential suppliers, customers, and competi-
tors."'" The potential for conflict which the Act created by granting control
of the system to the existing major carriers soon became a reality during
the resolution of several ambiguities inherent in this unique venture. The
purpose of the Act, to reflect "the benefits of this new technology in both
quality of services and charges for such services,"9 was impeded by the
carriers in their efforts to protect huge investments in undersea cables.
Their successful lobbying efforts with the FCC resulted in the destruction
of any possibility of Comsat serving as a potential competitor, thereby
keeping internationally leased circuit rates unnecessarily high. Ambigui-
ties in the Act concerning the various roles and objectives of the Govern-
ment resulted in the existence of almost constant tension between Comsat
and the State Department. This caused the United States to project a poor
image in INTELSAT and appears to have achieved little in the way of
world peace and understanding.
Despite all of these shortcomings which the first decade of operation has
produced, the future years show hope for the development of a more pro-
ductive global satellite system. The major carriers have now divested
themselves of most of their ownership in Comsat, so there should be fewer
inherent conflicts of interest within the organization. 3 Comsat should uti-
lize its power to make recommendations to the President and Congress in
order to stimulate greater legislative review. A reversal of some past FCC
rulings could provide the incentive necessary for innovation by allowing
Comsat to function as a true competitor. But so long as regulatory agencies
such as the FCC are allowed to render decisions consolidating control of a
new technology in the hands of the existing industry, there is little hope
that the objectives such as those proposed in the Communications Satellite
Act of 1962 will ever be realized.
Scott K. Socol
' Schwartz, supra note 32, at 464-65.
,2 47 U.S.C. § 701(b) (1970).
" "The major carriers, with the exception of AT&T, have all divested themselves of their
shareholdings with the result that only AT&T is now eligible to nominate and elect carrier
directors and, in fact, there are currently only three carrier directors on the Comsat Board,
all of whom represent AT&T. Establishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facili-
ties by Nongovernmental Entities, 38 F.C.C. 2d 665, 680 (Dec. 22, 1972).
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